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Anti-corruption efforts are required where corruption pre-
vails and Pakistan is a developing country that is facing the 
menace of corruption to a considerable degree. According 
to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception In-
dex (CPI) for 2019, Pakistan is ranked as 120th out of 180 
countries. With this in view, this study aims to ascertain the 
opinion of policy professionals working at various policy in-
stitutes in Pakistan regarding the effectiveness of 26 different 
anti-corruption strategies by means of a self-administered 
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questionnaire. The results show slight differences between 
the mean scores for anti-corruption strategies, depicting a 
certain level of effectiveness for each strategy. Harsher pun-
ishments for corrupt persons and legal protection for whis-
tleblowers informing about persons involved in corruption 
are the strategies that had the highest mean scores of 4.07 
and 4.04 respectively. The typology “Political, legal and judi-
cial strategies” was the most effective, with the highest mean 
value of 3.90. A holistic approach is required in Pakistan to 
eradicate corruption from governmental offices. 
Keywords: corruption, anti-corruption, strategies, evalua-
tion, Pakistan
1. Introduction
Academic literature predominantly takes the view that corruption ob-
structs economic development (Mauro, 1995; Myint, 2000). Corruption 
reduces efficiency and increases inequality. It reduces economic growth 
and perceptibly pushes up income inequality (Gupta, Davoodi & Alon-
so-Terme, 2002). Estimates show that the cost of corruption amounts to 
more than 5 per cent of global GDP (OECD, 2014). Corruption leads 
to a reduction in foreign direct investment (Petrou & Thanos, 2014). It 
has a negative impact on human welfare because funds for the provision 
of services are not utilised in full and it results in poor service quality 
(Lambsdorf, 2001). Corruption undermines government revenue and, 
therefore, limits the ability of the government to invest in productivity-en-
hancing areas (Lopez-Claros, 2013). It also distorts decision-making con-
nected with public investment projects (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1998).
Tanzi (1998) plausibly argues that corruption will also reduce expenditure 
on health and education, because these are areas where it may be more 
difficult to collect bribes. Corruption corrodes public trust, undermines 
the rule of law, and ultimately delegitimises the state as well as the moral 
stature of the bureaucracy in the eyes of the people (Clausen, Kraay & 
Nyiri, 2011). According to Klitgaard (1998), the effects of corruption could 
extend in different directions. It could devastate economic and political de-
velopment. In fact, there is really no limit to the extent to which corruption, 
once it is unleashed and escapes the control of the authorities, can under-
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In the light of these effects of corruption, it can be stated that corruption 
is a dysfunction that should be eliminated. Pakistan has seen the problem 
of corruption at every tier of the government system – local, provincial, 
and federal. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2019, released by 
Transparency International (TI), ranks Pakistan as 120th among 180 coun-
tries in total. At one point, in 1995, Pakistan was the second most corrupt 
country in the world. Moreover, the Global Corruption Barometer for 
2017, also published by TI, shows that 40–50 per cent of the respondents 
have given a bribe to get a public service in Pakistan. The Global Com-
petitiveness Reports (2016; 2017; 2018), released by the World Economic 
Forum, have declared corruption to be the primary problem when doing 
business in Pakistan.
The extent and magnitude of corruption in Pakistan provide the rationale 
for fighting it. The questions that this paper seeks to address are the fol-
lowing: which different strategies have been used to fight corruption and 
which strategies have been effective in fighting corruption in Pakistan? 
The paper aims to ascertain the opinion of policy professionals on the 
effectiveness of various anti-corruption strategies. The information ob-
tained may be of use insofar as it will add to the knowledge and contribute 
to the picture of the corruption question in Pakistan. It also presents an 
informed reflection on the topic and should help initiate policy debate on 
fighting corruption in Pakistan.
The paper is organised as follows: section two provides a theoretical 
framework on corruption and reviews the literature on anti-corruption, 
section three presents the research methodology, while section four anal-
yses the results and discusses them before the study is concluded with 
recommendations.
2. Theoretical Understanding of Corruption and a 
Review of Anti-Corruption Strategies
Defining corruption is important because it serves as guidance in develop-
ing anti-corruption strategies. Experts of all kinds are largely unanimous 
in seeing corruption as a global problem that requires urgent attention, 
yet there is no universally accepted definition of corruption. This con-
tinues to challenge policy makers in devising anti-corruption strategies, 
especially in an international and cross-cultural context (Abjorensen, 
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office for private gain (OECD, 2008; World Bank 1997).1 A more com-
prehensive definition of corruption comes from TI, which sees it as the 
abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Killias, Mugellini, Isenring, & 
Villettaz, 2016; Osrecki, 2015). Similarly, the National Anti-Corruption 
Strategy (NACS) of Pakistan states that “corruption involves behaviour 
on the part of officeholders in the public and private sectors, in which 
they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves and/or those close to 
them, or induce others to do so, by misusing the position in which they 
are placed” (NACS, 2002). Khan (1996) defines corruption as a behav-
ioural deviation from the formal rules of conduct that govern the actions 
of public officeholders. The focus of these definitions is on officials and 
their behaviour. 
2.1. Theoretical Understanding of Corruption 
The literature on corruption provides three paradigms to explain the na-
ture of prevailing corruption in a specific relational context and under cer-
tain environmental circumstances. These are the economic paradigm, the 
cultural paradigm, and the neo-institutional paradigm (Vannucci, 2015).
Literature has discovered that anti-corruption policies are mainly moti-
vated by and centred on an economic conceptualisation of corruption 
(Marquette & Pfeiffer 2015; UNDP 2015; Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 
2013; Johnsøn, 2012; Rose-Ackerman 1978), which necessitates reducing 
the chances and incentives for corruption (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 
2013). The economic paradigm is based on the principal–agent model of 
corruption (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2013; Rose-Ackerman 1978). 
This theory suggests that three different parties are involved in any cor-
ruption transaction in the public sector: the principal, the agent, and a 
third party. The agent is supposed to look after the interests of the princi-
pal but in reality, they both may be pursuing different goals (Marquette, 
Flanary, Rao & Morris, 2011). The theory also focuses on the implication 
of trade-offs and gains (evaluated by individuals) being attributed as a 
result of functioning towards or against the act of corruption (Vannucci, 
2015). This theory perceives corruption as a consequence of actions taken 
as a result of rational thinking based on a cost-benefit analysis. Given this 
1 “Public office is abused for private gain when an official accepts, solicits, or extorts a 
bribe. It is also abused when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies 
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point of view, developing monitoring mechanisms and sanctions could be 
effective against corruption (Marquette & Pfeiffer, 2015).
The economic rationale for corrupt practices has been given through 
economic approaches towards corruption and they “model the corrupt 
employee as a rational actor who decides whether to engage in the cor-
rupt activity by balancing the potential benefits against potential costs 
and consequences” (Morgan 1998, p. 12).  Therefore, the anti-corruption 
strategies based on this model have emphasized public sector manage-
ment issues which aim to change the incentive structure in the public sec-
tor. Despite all its merits, it only focuses on the incidence of corruption 
in a very specific context. It is thus argued that this perspective should be 
supported by other approaches (Hutchinson, 2005).
Another paradigm, the cultural paradigm, suggests that “individuals be-
longing to different societies and organizations can be pushed toward cor-
ruption by the nature of their internalized values and by social pressures” 
(Vannucci, 2015, p. 11). Whereas the economic paradigm approaches 
corruption as a risk versus reward and cost-benefit evaluation process, 
the cultural approach considers corruption based on moral values, rules, 
and societal norms. Studies carried out by anthropologists show that cor-
ruption is an outcome of individual-to-individual relations and their asso-
ciation with the system in which they live. The creation of a system can 
be influenced by social behaviours, distribution of power, and the setup 
of formal and informal rules. Therefore, the dynamics of corruption vary 
with time and societal setups, which suggests that corruption should be 
studied within a relevant context. This does not imply that corruption can 
be treated as a relativistic concept which is admissible in some societies 
but not in others. In fact, corruption is discouraged explicitly across the 
globe without any discrimination of cultures where it may take place, but 
what qualifies as corrupt may vary based on societal context (Marquette, 
Flanary, Rao & Morris, 2011).
Husted (1994), della Porta and Vannucci (1999; 2012), and Lambsdorff 
(2007) agree on the neo-institutional approach to analysing corruption. 
This approach has been an influential and important paradigm in political 
science for the last three decades (Hellman, 2015). The neo-institutional 
paradigm entails the aspects of both the economic approach and cultural 
approach which include economic incentives and moral barriers as well as 
the institutional framework to control corruption by regulating the effects 
of social interactions on the preferences of individuals. Corruption is an 
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2.2. Review of Anti-Corruption Strategies
Corruption has been declared a multifaceted phenomenon (Ellis, 2019; 
Ceva & Ferretti, 2017). It involves a diversity of activities, actors, and be-
haviours. This makes it difficult to define corruption as a problem, but it 
is also difficult to design, implement, and evaluate responses to it. The di-
versity of definitions and proposed solutions create confusion in designing 
specific anti-corruption policies. Moreover, there is also poor theoretical 
alignment between existing forms of corruption and the measures taken 
to control it, and policy professionals are not aware of relevant and appro-
priate policy tools to counter it (Jancsics, 2019). 
The progress of anti-corruption measures has been an evolutionary process 
which has seen different approaches evolve. In the early 1990s, the first 
wave to combat corruption internationally started with raising awareness 
through anti-corruption programmes that somehow failed due to limit-
ed focus and a technocratic approach. In the 2000s, the second wave of 
anti-corruption efforts came with the aim of capacity-building and skills 
development (Habtemichael, 2009; Michael, 2007). While formulating ef-
fective anti-corruption strategies, designers must free themselves from any 
bias to ensure their sustainability. Unfortunately, there is no universally ac-
claimed model of fighting corruption, but there are strategies to overcome 
it. Factors which are important in formulating anti-corruption strategies 
are the type of corruption, its magnitude, the agency involved, beneficiar-
ies, victims, and the underlying reasons which promote opportunities for 
corruption (Habtemichael, 2009). Anti-corruption policies are considered 
effective when they reduce the opportunities for corruption and strengthen 
the social and normative barriers against it (Vannucci, 2015).
Based on the theoretical paradigms of corruption, there are many strat-
egies to combat corruption depending on the context in which they are 
applied.  However, it is crucial to assess the level, types, and causes of cor-
ruption before designing any anti-corruption strategy (Hanna et al., 2011; 
Habtemichael, 2009). Moreover, according to Riley (cited in Habtem-
ichael, 2009), this also depends on the socioeconomic development of 
the country, cultural sensitivity, and the relative financial and political 
strengths of those who are involved in corruption. Literature provides use-
ful and interesting typologies of anti-corruption interventions.
Huberts’ (1998) survey, which sampled the opinions of experts from 
developed and developing countries, distinguished between six main 
anti-corruption typologies comprising 21 strategic methods to combat 
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er-income countries. Based on Hurberts’ (1998) work, Camerer (2001) 
evaluated the effectiveness of 29 anti-corruption strategies grouped into 
five categories. During the survey, more than 150 experts were inter-
viewed in South Africa. The experts ranked the following eight strate-
gies as very effective in controlling corruption: greater transparency in 
government tender processes, schools placing more emphasis on moral 
values, legal protection for whistleblowers, prosecution of high-profile 
individuals, barring corrupt officials from holding public office, greater 
financial control over/internal audits of government spending, a national 
anti-corruption hotline, and vigorous media investigation of corruption. 
Four anti-corruption strategies were ranked as least effective in curbing 
corruption: cross-sectoral anti-corruption conferences, increased salaries 
for government employees, codes of conduct to promote professional eth-
ics, and a single independent agency to fight corruption.
Huther and Shah (2000) provide empirical evidence for selected individu-
al anti-corruption efforts and conclude that widespread corruption is likely 
to be the result of multiple governance failures, which indicates that suc-
cessful anti-corruption campaigns are likely to be multi-pronged. Similar-
ly, Haarhuis and Leeuw (2004) analyse the World Bank’s anti-corruption 
programme which integrates both top-down and bottom-up approaches. 
The former consists of strategies related to administrative and judicial 
reforms, while the latter deals with awareness strategies. It concludes that 
indicators need to be developed to assess the relevance of national an-
ti-corruption policies to country-specific governance and anti-corruption 
conditions. Based on university students’ perception, Hussain and Riaz 
(2012) evaluated 23 different anti-corruption strategies. Because there 
was very small variance among the anti-corruption strategies as viewed by 
the students, they were not grouped separately into effective and ineffec-
tive strategies. Instead, they were all considered as effective anti-corrup-
tion strategies which can be used to fight corruption.
The question is what strategies should be enacted to combat corruption. An-
ti-corruption interventions that work in one setting may not necessarily apply 
in another. Therefore, the success or failure of such strategies may depend 
on the context in which they are being implemented (Hanna et al., 2011). 
Valuing the context of anti-corruption interventions, the contribution of this 
paper is to advance the existing literature and present a case of combating 
corruption in Pakistan. It is based on an inventory of anti-corruption strat-
egies available in the literature and practiced in Pakistan. Twenty-six such 
anti-corruption strategies have been distinguished for evaluation by policy 
professionals. Furthermore, an attempt has been made to construct a typol-
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3. Research Methods and Hypotheses
The study was conducted to obtain the opinion of policy professionals 
on the effectiveness of different anti-corruption strategies. The purposive 
sampling technique was used to ascertain the views of policy profession-
als. This technique involves the identification and selection of individuals 
or groups of individuals who are proficient and well-informed regarding 
a phenomenon of interest (Cresswell & Plano Clark, 2011). In this re-
search, policy professionals are the unit of analysis. In certain areas of 
social science research that require specialised knowledge, samples are 
drawn not from the general population, but rather from an allegedly 
knowledgeable part of the population, which serves as the universe. This 
so-called policy professionals sample has some advantages over the general 
public, such as concentrated knowledge or at least interest in the subject 
matter (Camerer, 2001). In this study, these policy professionals were 
sourced from different policy institutes/think tanks which have expertise 
in the field of governance and anti-corruption.
The data collection instrument used in the study was a close-ended ques-
tionnaire adapted from two sources (Hussain & Riaz, 2012) and Camerer 
(2001). It consisted of two parts: one with questions about the respond-
ents’ profile and the other containing 26 anti-corruption proposals which 
were graded on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = very ineffective 
to 5 = very effective. All the strategies were grouped into six categories: 
(1) promoting anti-corruption culture (six strategies); (2) ensuring trans-
parency and access to information (five strategies); (3) organisational and 
administrative strategies (four strategies); (4) monitoring and oversight 
strategies (three strategies); (5) political, legal, and judicial strategies (six 
strategies); and (6) economic strategies (two strategies).
The data were analysed based on test value 3 for a five-point Likert scale 
to evaluate how respondents perceived the effectiveness of different an-
ti-corruption strategies. The following hypotheses, equation (1) and equa-
tion (2), were formulated to be tested empirically:
H1 = �promoting anti-corruption culture = �ensuring transparency and access to information  
= �organizational and administrative strategies = �monitoring and oversight strategies  
= �political, legal, and judicial strategies = �economic strategies ≥3
i.e. the mean value for each category is greater than or equal to 3.
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i.e. the mean value for each strategy is greater than or equal to 3.
Here, the mean value scored above the test value 3 will show the effec-
tiveness of that strategy or category, as the case may be. If the value for 
any strategy was found to be less than 3, the strategy was assumed to be 
ineffective.
After passing through validity and reliability tests at pilot testing stage, 
data were collected from policy professionals at twelve policy institutes/
think tanks.2 Out of 125 questionnaires, 105 were returned. To achieve 
accurate and authentic results, questionnaires must be completed proper-
ly. Five questionnaires out of 105 were either incomplete or they had not 
been completed by the targeted persons from the policy desks; hence they 
were excluded from further proceedings. The response rate was 80 per 
cent. This study did not require names or the personal identity of the re-
spondents and participation in the study was completely anonymous and 
voluntary. The respondents were informed that the information gathered 
from them would be used exclusively for research purposes, their identity 
would not be disclosed and the institute they belong to would not be used 
as a unit of analysis in the study.
Before analysing the data, the reliability was checked by applying Cron-
bach’s Alpha Reliability test on anti-corruption strategies in Pakistan (Ta-
ble 1). The calculated value .907 is above 0.5, which confirms the reliabil-
ity of the data. 
Table 1: Cronbach’s Alpha on Anti-Corruption Strategies in Pakistan
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach’s Alpha Number of Items
.907 26
Source: Authors’ calculation.
2 The following policy institutes/think tanks were approached: Center for Peace and 
Development Institutions (CPDI), Free And Fair Election Network (FAFEN), Pakistan 
Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency (PILDAT), Pakistan Institute for 
Parliamentary Studies (PIPS), Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Institute 
of Strategic Studies (ISS), Strategic Vision Institute (SVI), Policy Research Institute of Mar-
ket Economy (PRIME), Jinnah Institute, Center for Policy Studies, Governance Institutes 
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The data were further analysed by means of descriptive and inferential 
statistics, using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) ver-
sion 20. Descriptive tests were applied to the first part of the survey which 
refers to the demographics of the respondents. The descriptive statistics 
can be found in Appendix A. Frequencies were calculated in descriptive 
tests that analyse the ratio of male to female respondents, their age group, 
qualifications, and work experience.
A one-way ANOVA was applied to check the impact of demographics 
on the level of effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies classified into 
six categories. To analyse the evaluation of anti-corruption strategies, a 
one-sample t-test was applied to analyse the means of anti-corruption 
strategies on the test-value 3. It was analysed whether the mean value 
for each strategy was above the test value or below the test value. Values 
that lie above the test value were interpreted to mean that strategies are 
effective in curbing corruption.
4. Findings and Discussion
Demographic statistics reveal that 54 per cent of the respondents were 
male and 46 per cent were female. The majority of the respondents (57 
per cent) were young policy professionals, 21–30 years of age; 36 per cent 
were 31–40 years old; 4 per cent were 41–50 years old; and 3 per cent 
were 50+ years old. These percentages show that the participants includ-
ed both young policy professionals and experienced ones with advanced 
knowledge in the field of study.
The demographics further revealed that the respondents were highly qual-
ified because the majority (40 per cent) had a master’s degree (16 years 
of education), while 35 per cent of the respondents had a MPhil qualifi-
cation (18 years of education), 18 per cent held a bachelor’s degree, and 
4 per cent of the respondents had a PhD.
As far as the respondents’ work experience is concerned, the majority of 
policy professionals (53 per cent) had fewer than 5 years of experience, 
30 per cent had 6–10 years of experience, 8 per cent had 11–15 years of 
experience, 5 per cent had 16–20 years of experience, and 4 per cent of 
policy professionals had over 20 years of work experience. A summary of 
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Table 2: Summary of Demographics of Respondents (Policy Professionals)
Gender Age
Description Percentage Description Percentage
Male 54 21–30 57





Description Percentage Description Percentage
Bachelor’s 18 Less than 5 years 53
Master’s 40 6–10 years 30
MS/MPhil 35 11–15 years 8
PhD 4 16–20 years 5
Any Other 3 21–25 years 2
Over 25 years 2
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The results of the one-way ANOVA based on age, qualification and gen-
der show that policy professionals with 21–25 years of work experience 
believe that economic strategies are ineffective, whereas the rest of the 
policy professionals evaluate these strategies as effective. Policy profes-
sionals with less than 20 years of work experience evaluate political, le-
gal and judicial strategies  as the most effective strategies to reduce the 
level of corruption. Respondents with over 20 years of work experience 
assess these strategies as ineffective in eradicating corruption. Strategies 
in the “Monitoring and oversight” category are graded as effective by all 
qualified policy professionals. However, policy professionals with a PhD 
judged them to be highly effective, while policy professionals with a bach-
elor’s degree rated these strategies as less effective. 
The means plot also shows that age plays a part in how effective anti-cor-
ruption strategies are seen to be. Policy professionals from all age groups 
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and “Political, legal, and judicial strategies” are more effective at reducing 
the level of corruption. 
All the strategies were grouped in six categories and a one-sample t-test 
was applied to the computed means for these categories. Each of the cat-
egories’ means obtained by the t-test was analysed against the test value 3. 
The one-sample t-test results for all categories are reported in Table 3. The 
results reveal that “Political, legal, and judicial strategies” are believed to 
be highly important in eradicating corruption, with the highest mean val-
ue of 3.90. “Ensuring transparency and access to information strategies” 
had a mean value of 3.84, while “Organisational and administrative strate-
gies” had a mean value of 3.73, showing the need for a transparent mech-
anism to cope with corruption. “Monitoring and oversight strategies” and 
“Economic strategies” had a mean value of 3.69 and 3.60 respectively. 
“Promoting anti-corruption culture strategies” had the lowest mean score 
of 3.55. As all the categories received a mean score of above 3, this proves 
the acceptance of H1. 
Table 3: Summary of One-Sample t-test on Anti-Corruption Categories
One Sample Statistics
Typologies t-statistic Mean Mean Difference
1 Promoting anti-corruption 
culture 
7.98* 3.55 .55
2 Ensuring transparency and 
access to information 
9.34* 3.84 .84
3 Organisational and 
administrative strategies
10.16* 3.73 .73
4 Monitoring and oversight 
strategies
9.03* 3.69 .69
5 Political, legal, and judicial 
strategies
12.05* 3.90 .90
6 Economic strategies 7.04* 3.60 .60
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The frequencies of policy professionals’ opinions can be found in Appen-
dix B. By using a one-sample t-test to calculate the mean value for each 
strategy, the study found the mean score for each strategy to be above the 
test value (3). This shows that none of the strategies are ineffective. Hence 
H2 is also accepted. Every strategy proposed in the study got weightage 
from the policy professionals for its effectiveness in fighting governmental 
corruption. Table 4 shows the values obtained by the one-sample t-test for 
all the strategies.
The results show that there are slight differences among the mean scores 
for all 26 anti-corruption strategies, which range from 3.30 to 4.07.  
Table 4: Evaluation of Anti-Corruption Strategies through One Sample Stati-
stics on Test Value 3





























Religious community placing greater emphasis 
on promoting moral values in everyday life
3.43
S3
A public awareness campaign to sensitise the 
general public regarding the evils of corruption
3.57
S4
Codes of conduct to promote professional 
ethics in the public sector 
3.64
S5
Regular anti-corruption conferences that bring 
together all sectors and stakeholders 
3.30
S6


































Greater access to government information 3.93
S8 Greater transparency of political funding 3.97
S9
Disclosure by civil servants and politicians of 
their assets and income
3.82
S10




Promoting investigative journalism to 
































Greater internal financial controls and internal 
audits of government spending
3.85
S13


























Establishment of a single independent anti-
corruption agency to fight corruption 
3.52
S16
Establishment of a watchdog institution to keep 
an eye on the implementation of anti-corruption 
strategies by anti-corruption agencies
3.68
S17
Increase the ability of parliament to oversee 
the activities of the government
3.64
S18
Establishment of a national anti-corruption 
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to hear cases regarding corruption
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Legal protection for whistleblowers informing 
about persons involved in corruption
4.04
S23 Increased political will to fight corruption 3.87
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Incentivising employees of anti-corruption 
agencies dealing with corruption related cases
3.60
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In the category of “Political, legal, and judicial strategies”, “increased po-
litical will to fight corruption”3 had the highest mean score (3.87), and at 
40 per cent, a very effective percentage. There seems to be a consensus 
in the corruption literature that without strong political will, anti-corrup-
tion reforms are bound to fail (Williams & Doig, 2004; Kpundeh, 2004; 
Brinkerhoff, 2000; Pope & Vogl, 2000). Since 1947 many laws have been 
introduced in Pakistan to combat corruption, such as the Prevention Cor-
ruption Act of 1947 and the National Accountability Ordinance of 1999. 
Furthermore, anti-corruption agencies and accountability bodies are op-
erational to control corruption. Recently, the federal government has in-
troduced amendments to the National Accountability Ordinance through 
a presidential ordinance4  because the federal government does not have a 
simple majority in the senate (second house of parliament) and has been 
unable to develop a consensus on accountability legislation. Governments 
in Pakistan have shown their resolve to combat corruption, but anti-cor-
ruption efforts have always been maligned as political victimisation and 
engineering to target political opponents.
The “Ensuring transparency and access to information strategies” cate-
gory focuses both on access to information and transparency. Transpar-
ency is considered one of the most important tools in fighting corrup-
tion (Kuunifaa, 2012; Sturges, 2007). It is defined as the disclosure of 
government information and its use by the public, so it requires a public 
that can access, understand, and use the information it receives from the 
government (Ginsberg et al., 2012). It provides a basis for government 
accountability and creates barriers against fraudulent interventions (Loch 
& Lumumba, 2014). For the promotion of transparency and accounta-
bility, FOI (Freedom of Information) laws are critical tools.5 They confer 
on the public the legal right to ask for and receive information held by 
public bodies. However, the enforceability of FOI laws is what sets it 
apart from general pledges of access to information made by governments 
(Holsen, 2007). Both the federal and provincial governments in Pakistan 
3 Political will refers to the sincerity of a government’s pledge to control corruption 
both in words and deeds. For details see Abdulai, (2009).
4 The National Accountability (Amendment) Ordinance 2019
5 The Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 under art.19 states: “Every citizen shall have the 
right to freedom of speech and expression, and there shall be freedom of the press, subject 
to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the glory of Islam or the 
integrity, security or defense of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly relations with foreign 
states, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, commission or 
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have promulgated FOI laws. In 2002, Pakistan introduced its first FOI 
law. Presently, Pakistan has five independent Right to Information (RTI) 
Acts, at the federal level6 and in its four provinces.7 However, these laws 
have not been implemented in their true spirit. 
The “Political, legal, and judicial strategies” category had the mean value 
of 3.90. Among individual strategies, “introducing harsher punishments for 
persons involved in corruption” had the highest mean value (4.07). If the in-
stitutional environment is not supportive, it is difficult to implement harsher 
punishments to reduce the level of corruption (Becker, 1968). Pakistan does 
not have capital punishment for persons proven guilty of corruption. China, 
a neighbouring country, is among the few countries that have introduced 
the death penalty for persons convicted of corruption; however, corruption 
is still not effectively deterred in China. Studies like those by Becker and 
Stigler (1974) and Rose-Ackerman (1978) conclude from their models that 
to be effective, penalties need to be tied to the marginal benefits of the re-
ceived gains from corruption (Haarhuis & Leeuw 2004, p. 559).
An institutional environment can be created where whistleblowers who 
inform about corrupt officials are protected. The anti-corruption strategy 
of legal protection for whistleblowers informing about persons involved in 
corruption (found in the “Political, legal, and judicial strategies” category) 
had the mean value of 4.04. There should be legal protection for whistle-
blowers informing about corrupt practices. Whistleblowing is defined as 
an act of an individual within an organisation who discloses information 
in order to report and correct corruption. Many countries have recognised 
its importance as an effective tool in exposing corruption and have intro-
duced legislation whereby whistleblowers are provided legal protection 
from reprisals or retaliation (Schultz & Harutyunyan, 2015).  Because, if 
they are not given security, they will not report against corruption (Pope, 
1996). The federal government in Pakistan has recently introduced legis-
lation on the establishment of the Whistleblower Protection and Vigilance 
Commission of 2019. The laws ensure protection and monetary incen-
tives for citizens reporting corruption. 
The anti-corruption strategy of “barring corrupt officials from holding 
public office”, found in “Political, legal, and judicial strategies”, had a 
6 Right of Access to Information Act 2017.
7 Baluchistan Freedom of Information Ordinance 2005, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa RTI 
Act, 2013, Punjab Transparency and the Right to Information Act, 2013, and Sindh Trans-
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mean value of 3.96. Thirty-seven per cent (37%) of policy professionals 
considered it a very effective measure to combat corruption. Camerer 
(2001) views it as a comparatively simple strategy to administer. In Paki-
stan, under Section 15 of the National Accountability Ordinance (NAO) 
of 2002, proven corrupt persons are disqualified from running in elections 
or holding public office for a period of ten years.  The anti-corruption 
strategy of “greater internal financial controls and internal audits of gov-
ernment spending”, in the category of “Organisational and administrative 
strategies”, had a mean score of 3.85, with 40 per cent of policy profes-
sionals considering it very effective. According to Bowles (2000), making 
the financial management system more transparent and accountable re-
duces the chances of corruption occurring (Haarhuis & Leeuw, 2004).
“Incentivising employees of anti-corruption agencies dealing with corrup-
tion-related cases” and “increasing the wages of public sector employees”, 
both in the category of “Economic strategies”, scored the same mean val-
ue of 3.60. Rauch and Evans (2000) found an increased level of corrup-
tion due to an increase in wages, but in Pakistan’s context, Hussain and 
Riaz (2012) found low wages to be a major cause of corruption. Need-
based corruption as opposed to greed-based corruption may be controlled 
by increasing the wage level and incentivising anti-corruption officials.
The category of “Monitoring and oversight strategies” had a mean value 
of 3.69. Regarding individual strategies, the “establishment of a nation-
al anti-corruption hotline for reporting and addressing fraudulent cases” 
scored a mean value of 3.77. In Pakistan, the NAB has established a fraud 
and anti-corruption hotline, UAN 111-NAB-NAB (111-622-622), whose 
purpose it is to receive telephone complaints against corruption and cor-
rupt practices (NAB, 2007). Transparency International Pakistan, in col-
laboration with the US Agency for International Development (USAID), 
has established an anti-fraud hotline (0800-84700) (USAID, 2019). In 
public service delivery organisations, a complaint hotline as a formal ac-
countability mechanism for citizens has reduced corruption (Caseley, 
2003), but the effectiveness of supra anti-corruption hotlines has yet to 
be established in reducing corruption.
Furthermore, the “establishment of a single independent anti-corruption 
agency to fight corruption” may not serve as a panacea for a widespread 
and systemic problem. There is also a feeling that a range of institutions 
with an anti-corruption mandate provide checks and balances and ensures 
that there is no single all-powerful agency which might become the politi-
cal police of the ruling party. It may be used for political victimisation, as 
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ruption agencies are not appropriate in countries where the chance of 
abuse is high (Huther & Shah, 2000; Klitgaard, 1988). In Pakistan, dif-
ferent of anti-corruption agencies were raised from time to time. Pakistan 
inherited the Special Police Establishment, replaced by the Federal In-
vestigation Agency in 1975. The Ehtesab Commission was established in 
1996. The Ehtesab Bureau supplemented its functions, as the former was 
entrusted with investigations, whereas the latter undertook prosecutions. 
The NAB was established in 1999 and charged with the responsibility of 
eliminating corruption by means of a holistic approach of awareness, pre-
vention, and enforcement. Anti-Corruption Establishments (ACEs) exist 
in each province.
To conclude, each strategy scored a mean value above the test value 3, 
which is to say that each strategy has a certain level of effectiveness and 
not a single strategy can be said to be ineffective. In the end, policy pro-
fessionals were also asked to suggest anti-corruption strategies apart from 
the 26 included in the questionnaire. They suggested stronger monitoring 
and evaluation of government activities, as well as proper enforcement of 
laws and punishment as envisioned in the laws. Policy professionals sug-
gested the strengthening of a transparency and accountability mechanism 
and the independence of anti-corruption agencies from political interfer-
ence. Furthermore, it was also suggested that anti-corruption laws should 
be properly implemented across the board, without any discrimination or 
favours.
5. Conclusion
Policy professionals believe that each strategy has a certain level of ef-
fectiveness in eradicating corruption, but the problem that renders these 
strategies ineffective lies in their implementation. Political will is required 
for the implementation of anti-corruption strategies to curb corruption 
(Abdulai, 2009). Corruption cannot be eradicated by just applying one or 
two strategies. A collective action approach must be adopted by the gov-
ernment and concerned anti-corruption bodies to overcome corruption. 
Sensitising people to the evils of corruption, punishments for engaging 
in corrupt activities, and giving protection to whistleblowers are the first 
steps. A fair judiciary must gain public trust and there should be no dis-
crimination while investigating and prosecuting corruption cases against 
any high profile officials. For these strategies to be properly implemented, 
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efforts made by anti-corruption agencies to undermine corruption. When 
policy professionals were asked to suggest another strategy, many stated 
the same strategies as included in the questionnaire but with a focus on 
the implementation mechanism.
The effectiveness or ineffectiveness of any anti-corruption strategy de-
pends on the political structure of the country and the implementation 
mechanism therein. Man-wai (2006) suggests that to develop an effective 
anti-corruption design, the external and internal environment should be 
scanned to determine the system that exists and the conditions where the 
problem lies. A single anti-corruption strategy may not serve as a pana-
cea in an environment where corruption is rampant and ingrained in the 
system. Some other factors required to implement strategies effectively 
and to get positive results are: adequate resources, capacity building of 
anti-corruption agencies, meritocracy, and limited discretionary powers. 
Anti-corruption now has broader connotations. It is more than transpar-
ency and accountability. Anti-corruption is subject to good governance. 
This research has several limitations. Analysing the ratio of age and work 
experience of policy professionals revealed that the majority have less 
than 5 years of work experience and majority of them are less than 40 
years old. This can be taken as both a limitation and an advantage to the 
study. Less experienced, young policy professionals can present a limita-
tion to the study as it can be said that less experienced persons cannot 
evaluate solutions to corruption. On the other hand, it can be seen as an 
advantage because new employees can bring greater change and fresh 
graduates can deal with issues in effective and creative ways. Despite the 
limitations to the study, the information obtained may be of some use by 
adding to the existing knowledge and contributing to the picture of the 
corruption question in Pakistan. It presents, at the very least, an informed 
and educated reflection. The perceived priorities of policy professionals 
should not be used as the only basis for policy interventions. These find-
ings could be used together with other sources of information in order to 
promote a more informed approach to the problem of fighting corruption 
in Pakistan.
A lack of literature on anti-corruption strategies with reference to Paki-
stan suggests that more research is needed on anti-corruption. This study 
can be further taken as an evaluation of the present anti-corruption mech-
anism in Pakistan, as it mainly focuses on the evaluation of anti-corrup-
tion strategies. Therefore, more detailed research can be conducted to 
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FIGHTING GOVERNMENTAL CORRUPTION IN PAKISTAN: AN 
EVALUATION OF ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES
Summary
Corruption remains a persistent problem in both developed and developing co-
untries. Statistics provide evidence that Pakistan faces the menace of corruption. 
The recently released Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2019 by Transpa-
rency International (TI) ranks Pakistan as the 120th country out of a total of 
180. In 1995 Pakistan used to be the second most corrupt country in the world. 
Moreover, TI’s Global Corruption Barometer for 2017 shows that 40–50 per 
cent of the respondents have given a bribe to get a public service in Pakistan. The 
Global Competitiveness Reports (2016, 2017, and 2018) released by the World 
Economic Forum in Switzerland have declared corruption to be the topmost pro-
blematic factor when doing business in Pakistan. Corruption is a public problem 
and relevant academic literature holds the dominant view that it obstructs econo-
mic development. It increases the direct costs of firms through bribery. It encou-
rages bureaucratic red tape and corrupts the institutions of contract enforcement 
and property rights protection. Although corruption and anti-corruption have 
long been research topics in the social sciences, little has been done about the 
evaluation of anti-corruption strategies. Anti-corruption efforts are required whe-
re corruption prevails. With this in view, the study aims to ascertain the opinion 
of policy professionals regarding different anti-corruption strategies. Data on 26 
anti-corruption strategies were collected through a self-administered questionna-
ire from 100 policy professionals working in 12 different policy institutes. The 
results have found slight differences between the mean scores for anti-corruption 
strategies, depicting a certain level of effectiveness for each strategy. Harsher pu-
nishments for corrupt persons and legal protection for whistleblowers informing 
about persons involved in corruption are the strategies that had the highest mean 
scores of 4.07 and 4.04 respectively. Policy professionals rated the category of 
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the most effective anti-corruption typology. A holistic approach is required in 
Pakistan  to eradicate corruption from governmental offices.
Keywords: corruption, anti-corruption, strategies, evaluation, Pakistan
PAKISTANSKA BORBA PROTIV KORUPCIJE: EVALUACIJA 
ANTIKORUPCIJSKIH STRATEGIJA
Sažetak
Korupcija je i dalje prisutna i u razvijenim zemljama i u onima u razvoju. Stati-
stički pokazatelji upućuju na to da se i u Pakistanu javlja problem korupcije. Pre-
ma indeksu percepcije korupcije koji je organizacija Transparency International 
(TI) objavila 2019., Pakistan se nalazi na 120. mjestu od ukupno 180 država, 
dok je 1995. bio druga najkorumpiranija država na svijetu. Podaci TI-jeva glo-
balnoga korupcijskog barometra iz 2017. pokazuju da je 40-50 % pakistanskih 
ispitanika nekoga podmitilo kako bi zauzvrat dobilo javnu uslugu. Nadalje, u 
svojim je izvješćima o globalnoj konkurentnosti iz 2016., 2017. i 2018. švicarski 
Svjetski ekonomski forum problem korupcije stavio na prvo mjesto kada je riječ o 
poslovanju u Pakistanu. U literaturi prevladava stav da korupcija, osim što je 
riječ o javnom problemu, ograničava i ekonomski razvoj. Podmićivanje povećava 
izravne troškove poduzeća, a pod utjecajem korupcije buja suvišna birokracija te 
pati provedba ugovora i zaštita imovinskih prava. Iako su i problem korupcije i 
antikorupcija već dugo predmeti društvenih istraživanja, nedovoljno su se dosad 
bavila procjenom antikorupcijskih strategija. Ondje gdje je prisutna korupcija, 
potrebne su i antikorupcijske mjere. Cilj je rada utvrditi mišljenje stručnjaka za 
javne politike o različitim antikorupcijskim strategijama. Upitnikom je prikuplje-
no mišljenje 100 stručnjaka iz 13 različitih instituta o ukupno 26 antikorupcij-
skih strategija. Rezultati su pokazali manje razlike između srednjih vrijednosti za 
različite antikorupcijske strategije te je zabilježena određena razina učinkovitosti 
za svaku strategiju. Antikorupcijske strategije za koje su dobivene najviše srednje 
vrijednosti rezultata ispitanika jesu uvođenje strožih kazna za korumpirane osobe 
(4,04) i zakonska zaštita za zviždače koji upozoravaju na osobe koje sudjeluju u 
koruptivnim radnjama (4,07). Stručnjaci za javne politike ocijenili su kategoriju 
naziva „Političke, pravne i pravosudne strategije” najuspješnijom antikorupcij-
skom kategorijom (najviša srednja vrijednost 3,90). Potreban je holistički pristup 
iskorjenjivanju korupcije iz javne uprave. 
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Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics of Anti-Corruption Typologies





100 1.83 4.83 3.55 .68
Ensuring transparency 
and access to 
information




100 1.75 5.00 3.73 .72
Monitoring and 
oversight strategies
100 1.00 5.00 3.69 .77
Political, legal and 
judicial strategies
100 1.50 5.00 3.90 .74
Economic strategies 100 1.00 5.00 3.60 .85
Valid N 100
Source: Authors’ calculations.
























































S1 6 11 31 31 21 Effective
S2 9 11 28 32 20 Effective
S3 4 9 28 44 15 Effective
S4 4 10 25 40 21 Effective
S5 3 17 38 31 11 Effective
S6 2 10 23 32 33 Effective
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S8 4 6 20 29 41 Effective
S9 5 9 22 27 37 Effective
S10 5 10 20 33 32 Effective
S11 3 13 24 32 28 Effective
S12 6 9 19 26 40 Effective
S13 6 9 16 31 38 Effective
S14 1 9 27 45 18 Effective
S15 6 10 25 44 15 Effective
S16 4 8 26 40 22 Effective
S17 3 11 25 41 20 Effective
S18 2 5 32 36 25 Effective
S19 5 7 21 44 23 Effective
S20 5 5 19 53 18 Effective
S21 7 4 12 29 48 Effective
S22 5 4 12 40 39 Effective
S23 3 14 16 27 40 Effective
S24 5 5 16 37 37 Effective
S25 2 11 29 41 17 Effective
S26 2 17 23 35 23 Effective
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Appendix C. Survey Questionnaire
Part I
Gender a. Male b. Female
Age a. 21–30 c. 31–40 d. 41–50
 e. Over 50
Qualification a. Bachelor’s b. Master’s c. MS/M.Phil
 d. PhD e. Any other
Work Experience a. Less than 5 years b. 6–10 years c. 11–15 years





Ulain, N. & Hussain, F. (2020). Fighting Governmental Corruption in Pakistan: An Evaluation...
HKJU-CCPA, 20(3), 439–468
Part II
The following are anti-corruption strategies to eliminate corruption. Please say for 
each proposed strategy whether you think it would be very effective, effective, mo-
derately effective, ineffective or very ineffective at reducing corruption in Pakistan.
1. Education curriculum placing greater emphasis on moral values
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
2. Religious community placing greater emphasis on promoting moral 
values in everyday life
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
3. A public awareness campaign to sensitise the general public about the 
evils of corruption
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
4. Codes of conduct to promote professional ethics in the public sector
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
5. Increased political will to fight corruption
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
6. Greater access to government information
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
7. Greater transparency of political funding
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
8. More research on the causes, nature and extent of corruption
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
9. Regular anti-corruption conferences that bring together all sectors and 
stakeholders
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d. Effective e. Very effective
10. Disclosure by civil servants and politicians of their income and assets
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
11. Greater transparency of government tendering / procurement procedures
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
12. Promoting investigative journalism to investigate corruption related 
cases
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
13. Incentivising employees of anti-corruption agencies dealing with 
corruption related cases
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
14. Increasing wages of public sector employees
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
15. Greater internal financial controls and internal audits of government 
spending
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
16. Blacklisting businesses /NGOs proved to be involved in corruption
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
17. Rationalisation of discretionary powers of public office holders
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
18. Barring corrupt officials from holding public office
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
19. Establishment of a single independent anti-corruption agency to fight 
corruption
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d. Effective e. Very effective
20. Establishment of a watchdog institution to keep an eye on the imple-
mentation of anti-corruption strategies by anti-corruption agencies
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
21. Increase the ability of parliament to oversee the activities of the go-
vernment
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
22. Establishment of a national anti-corruption hotline for reporting and 
addressing of fraudulent cases
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
23. Establishment of special accountability courts to hear cases regarding 
corruption
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
24. More resources to investigate and prosecute corruption cases
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
25. Introducing harsher punishments for persons involved in corruption
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective
26. Legal protection for whistleblowers informing about persons involved 
in corruption
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective 
27. Any other anti-corruption strategy suggested by you. Also rate the 
level of effectiveness.
a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective 
d. Effective e. Very effective 
